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1. Introduction 
I suggest that ‘scientific reticence’, in some cases, hinders communication with the public about 
dangers of global warming.  If I am right, it is important that policy-makers recognize the potential 
influence of this phenomenon. 
 Scientific reticence may be a consequence of the scientific method.  Success in science depends 
on objective skepticism.  Caution, if not reticence, has its merits.  However, in a case such as ice sheet 
instability and sea level rise, there is a danger in excessive caution.  We may rue reticence, if it serves to 
lock in future disasters. 
Barber (1961) describes a ‘resistance by scientists to scientific discovery’, with a scholarly 
discussion of several sources of cultural resistance.  There are aspects of the phenomenon that Barber 
discusses in the ‘scientific reticence’ that I describe, but additional factors come into play in the case of 
global climate change and sea level rise. 
I can illustrate ‘scientific reticence’ best via personal experiences.  The examples are relevant to 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) process of consensus building, specifically to the 
issue of possible sea level rise. 
 
2. The Court Case. 
‘Scientific reticence’ leapt to mind as I was being questioned, and boxed-in, by a lawyer for the 
plaintiff in Automobile Manufacturers versus California Air Resources Board (Auto Manufacturers 
2006).  I conceded that I was not a glaciologist.  The lawyer then, with aplomb, requested that I identify 
glaciologists who agreed publicly with my assertion that sea level was likely to rise more than one meter 
this century if greenhouse gas emissions followed an IPCC business-as-usual (BAU) scenario: “Name 
one!” 
I could not, instantly.  I was dismayed, because, in conversation and e-mail exchange with 
relevant scientists I sensed a deep concern about likely consequences of BAU global warming for ice 
sheet stability.  What would be the legal standing of such a lame response as ‘scientific reticence’?  Why 
would scientists be reticent to express concerns about something so important? 
I suspect the existence of what I call the “John Mercer effect”.  Mercer (1978) suggested that 
global warming from burning of fossil fuels could lead to disastrous disintegration of the West Antarctic 
ice sheet, with sea level rise of several meters worldwide.  This was during the era when global warming 
was beginning to get attention from the United States Department of Energy and other science agencies.  I 
noticed that scientists who disputed Mercer, suggesting that his paper was alarmist, were treated as being 
more authoritative. 
It was not obvious who was right on the science, but it seemed to me, and I believe to most 
scientists, that the scientists preaching caution and downplaying the dangers of climate change fared 
better in receipt of research funding.  Drawing attention to the dangers of global warming may or may not 
have helped increase funding for relevant scientific areas, but it surely did not help individuals like 
Mercer who stuck their heads out.  I could vouch for that from my own experience.  After I published a 
paper (Hansen et al 1981) that described likely climate effects of fossil fuel use, the Department of 
Energy reversed a decision to fund our research, specifically highlighting and criticizing aspects of that 
paper at a workshop in Coolfont, West Virginia and in publication (MacCracken 1983). 
I believe there is a pressure on scientists to be conservative.  Papers are accepted for publication 
more readily if they do not push too far and are larded with caveats.  Caveats are essential to science, 
being born in skepticism, which is essential to the process of investigation and verification.  But there is a 
question of degree.  A tendency for ‘gradualism’ as new evidence comes to light may be ill-suited for 
communication, when an issue with short time fuse is concerned. 
However, these matters are subjective.  I could not see how to prove the existence of a ‘scientific 
reticence’ about ice sheets and sea level.  Score one for the plaintiff, and their ally and ‘friend of the 
court’, the United States federal government. 
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3. On the Ice 
A field glaciologist, referring to a moulin on Greenland, said: “the whole damned ice sheet is 
going to go down that hole!”  He was talking about his expectations, under the assumption of continued 
unchecked growth of global GHG emissions.  Field glaciologists have been doing a good job of reporting 
current trends on the ice sheets.  It is translation of field data into conclusions needed by the public and 
policymakers that is at issue. 
 Ice sheet disintegration, unlike ice sheet growth, is a wet process that can proceed rapidly.  
Multiple positive feedbacks accelerate the process once it is underway.  These feedbacks occur on and 
under the ice sheets and in the nearby oceans. 
A key feedback on the ice sheets is the ‘albedo flip’ (Hansen et al 2007) that occurs when snow 
and ice begin to melt.  Snow-covered ice reflects back to space most of the sunlight striking it.  However, 
as warming causes melting on the surface, the darker wet ice absorbs much more solar energy.  Most of 
resulting melt water burrows through the ice sheet, lubricates its base, and thus speeds discharge of 
icebergs to the ocean (Zwally et al. 2002). 
 The area with summer melt on Greenland increased from ~450,000 km2 when satellite 
observations began in 1979 to more than 600,000 km2 in 2002 (Steffen et al 2004).  Linear fit to data for 
1992-2005 yields an increase of melt area of +40,000 km2 per year (Tedesco 2007), but this rate may be 
exaggerated by the effect of stratospheric aerosols from the 1991 volcanic eruption of Mount Pinatubo, 
which reduced summer melt in 1992.  Summer melt on West Antarctica has received less attention than 
on Greenland, but it is more important.  Satellite QuickSCAT radiometer observations reveal increasing 
areas of summer melt on West Antarctica and an increasing melt season length during the period 1999-
2005 (Nghiem et al 2007). 
 The key role of the ocean, in the matter of ice sheet stability, is as a conduit for excess global-
scale heating that eventually leads to melting of ice.  The process begins with increasing human-made 
greenhouse gases, which cause the atmosphere to be more opaque at infrared wavelengths.  The increased 
atmospheric opacity causes heat radiation to space to emerge from a higher level, where it is colder, thus 
decreasing radiation of heat to space.  As a result, the Earth is now out of energy balance by between 0.5 
and 1 W/m2 (Hansen et al 2005). 
This planetary energy imbalance is itself now sufficient to melt ice corresponding to one meter of 
sea level rise per decade, if the energy were used entirely for that purpose (Hansen et al 2005).  However, 
so far most of the excess energy has been going into the ocean.  Acceleration of ice sheet disintegration 
requires tapping into ocean heat, which occurs primarily in two ways (Hansen 2005): (1) increased 
velocity of outlet glaciers (flowing in rock-walled channels) ice streams (bordered mainly by slower 
moving ice), and thus increased flux and subsequent melting of icebergs discharged to the open ocean, 
and (2) direct contact of ocean and ice sheet (underneath and against fringing ice shelves).  Ice loss from 
the second process has a positive feedback on the first process: as buttressing ice shelves melt, ice stream 
velocity increases. 
Positive feedback from loss of buttressing ice shelves is relevant to some Greenland ice streams, 
but the West Antarctic ice sheet, which rests on bedrock well below sea level (Thomas et al 2004), will be 
affected much more.  Loss of ice shelves provides exit routes with reduced resistance for ice from further 
inland, as suggested by Mercer (1978) and earlier by Hughes (1972).  Warming ocean waters are now 
thinning some West Antarctic ice shelves by several meters per year (Payne et al 2004; Shepherd et al 
2004). 
The Antarctic Peninsula recently provided a laboratory to study feedback interactions, albeit for 
ice volumes less than those in the major ice sheets.  Combined actions of surface melt (van den Broeke 
2005) and ice shelf thinning from below (Shepherd et al 2003) led to sudden collapse of the Larsen B ice 
shelf, which was followed by acceleration of glacial tributaries far inland (Rignot et al 2004; Scambos et 
al. 2004).  The summer warming and melt that preceded ice shelf collapse (Fahnestock et al. 2002; 
Vaughan et al 2003) was no more than the global warming expected this century under BAU scenarios, 
and only a fraction of expected West Antarctic warming with realistic polar amplification of global 
warming. 
Scientific reticence and sea level rise 
 4 
 Modeling studies yield increased ocean heat uptake around West Antarctica and Greenland due to 
increasing human-made greenhouse gases (Hansen et al 2006b).  Observations show a warming ocean 
around West Antarctica (Shepherd et al 2004), ice shelves thinning several meters per year (Rignot and 
Jacobs 2002; Payne et al 2004), and increased iceberg discharge (Thomas et al 2004).  As discharge of ice 
increases from a disintegrating ice sheet, as occurs with all deglaciations, regional cooling by the icebergs 
is significant, providing a temporary negative feedback (Hansen 2005).  However, this cooling effect is 
limited on global scale as shown by comparison with the planetary energy imbalance, which is sufficient 
to melt ice equivalent to about one meter of sea level per decade (Table S1 of Hansen et al. 2005).  
Indeed, cooling of the ocean surface by melting ice increases the planetary energy imbalance, thus 
supplying additional energy for ice melt, so the planetary energy imbalance should not be thought of as a 
limit on the rate of ice melt. 
Global warming should also increase snowfall accumulation rates in ice sheet interiors because of 
the higher moisture content of the warming atmosphere.  Despite high variability on interannual and 
decadal time scales, and limited Antarctic warming to date, observations tend to support this expectation 
for both Greenland and Antarctica (Rignot and Thomas 2002; Johannessen et al 2005; Davis et al 2005; 
Monaghan et al 2006).  Indeed, some models (Wild et al 2003) have ice sheets growing overall with 
global warming, but those models do not include realistic processes of ice sheet disintegration.  Extensive 
paleoclimate data confirm the common sense expectation that the net effect is for ice sheets to shrink as 
the world warms. 
The most compelling data for the net change of ice sheets is provided by the gravity satellite 
mission GRACE, which shows that both Greenland (Chen et al 2006) and Antarctica (Velicogna et al 
2006) are losing mass at substantial rates.  The most recent analyses of the satellite data (S. Klosco et al 
priv. comm.) confirm that Greenland and Antarctica are each losing mass at a rate of about 150 cubic 
kilometers per year, with the Antarctic mass loss primarily in West Antarctica.  These rates of mass loss 
are at least a doubling of rates of several years earlier, and only a decade earlier these ice sheets were 
much closer to mass balance (Casenave 2006). 
 The Antarctic data are the most disconcerting.  Warming there has been limited in recent decades, 
at least in part due to effects of ozone depletion (Shindell and Schmidt 2004).  The fact that West 
Antarctica is losing mass at a significant rate suggests that the thinning ice shelves are already beginning 
to have an effect on ice discharge rates.  Warming of the ocean surface around Antarctica (Hansen et al 
2006a) is small compared with the rest of world, consistent with climate model simulations (IPCC 2007), 
but that limited warming is expected to increase (Hansen et al 2006b).  The detection of recent, increasing 
summer surface melt on West Antarctica (Nghiem et al 2007) raises the danger that feedbacks among 
these processes could lead to nonlinear growth of ice discharge from Antarctica. 
 
4. Urgency: This Problem is Non-Linear! 
 IPCC business-as-usual (BAU) scenarios are constructs in which it is assumed that emissions of 
CO2 and other greenhouse gases will continue to increase year after year.  Some energy analysts take it as 
almost a law of physics that such growth of emissions will continue in the future.  Clearly, there is not 
sufficiently widespread appreciation of the implications of putting back into the air a large fraction of the 
carbon stored in the ground over epochs of geologic time.  Climate forcing due to these greenhouse gases 
would dwarf the climate forcing for any time in the past several hundred thousand years, when accurate 
records of atmospheric composition are available from ice cores. 
However, the long-term global cooling and increase of global ice through the Plio-Pleistocene 
provides an even more poignant illustration of the implications of continued BAU burning of fossil fuels.  
The global oxygen isotope record of benthic (deep ocean dwelling) foraminifera compiled by Lisieki and 
Raymo (2005), repeated in Figure 10a of Hansen et al (2007) for comparison with solar insolation 
changes over the same period, reveals long-term cooling and sea level fall, with superposed oscillations at 
a dominant frequency of 41 ky.  The long-term cooling presumably is due, at least in part, to drawdown 
of atmospheric CO2 by weathering that accompanied and followed the rapid growth of the Andes (Ghosh 
et al 2006), which was most rapid in the late Miocene.  Changes in meridional heat transport may have 
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contributed to the climate trend (Rind and Chandler 1991), but the CO2 amount providing a global 
positive forcing seems unlikely to have been more than approximately 350-450 ppm (Dowsett et al 1994; 
Raymo et al 1996; Crowley 1996).  Global mean temperature three million years ago was only 2-3°C 
warmer than today (Crowley 1996; Dowsett et al 1996), while sea level was 25 ± 10 m higher (Wardlaw 
and Quinn 1991; Barrett et al 1992; Dowsett et al 1994). 
The Plio-Pleistocene record compiled by Lisieki and Raymo (2005) is fascinating to 
paleoclimatolgists as it clearly shows the expected dominance of global climate variations with the 41 ky 
cyclic variation of the tilt of the Earth’s spin axis, increased tilt melting ice at both poles.  When the 
planetary cooling reached a degree that allowed a large mid-latitude Northern Hemisphere (Laurentide) 
ice sheet, the periodicity necessarily became more complex, because of the absence of land area for a 
similar ice sheet in the Southern Hemisphere (Hansen et al 2007).  However, the information of practical 
importance from the Plio-Pleistocene record is the implication of dramatic global climate change with 
only moderate global climate forcing.  With global warming of only 2-3°C and CO2 of perhaps 350-450 
ppm it was a dramatically different planet, without Arctic sea ice in the warm seasons and sea level 25 ± 
10 m higher. 
Assuming a nominal ‘Charney’ climate sensitivity of 3°C equilibrium global warming for 
doubled CO2, BAU scenarios yield a global warming at least of the order of 3°C by the end of this 
century.  However, the Charney sensitivity is the equilibrium (long-term) global response when only fast 
feedback processes (changes of sea ice, clouds, water vapor and aerosols in response to climate change) 
are included (Hansen et al 2007).  Actual global warming would be larger as slow feedbacks come into 
play.  Slow feedbacks include increased vegetation at high latitudes, ice sheet shrinkage, and terrestrial 
and marine greenhouse gas emissions in response to global warming. 
In assessing likely effects of warming of 3°C, it is useful to note the effects of the 0.7°C warming 
in the past century (Hansen et al 2006a).  This warming already produces large areas of summer melt on 
Greenland and significant melt on West Antarctica.  Global warming of several more degrees, with its 
polar amplification, would have both Greenland and West Antarctica bathed in summer melt for extended 
melt seasons. 
The IPCC (2007) midrange projection for sea level rise this century is 20-43 cm [8-17 inches] and 
its full range is 18-59 cm [7-23 inches].  IPCC notes that they are unable to evaluate possible dynamical 
responses of the ice sheets, and thus do not include any possible “rapid dynamical changes in ice flow”.  
Yet the provision of such specific numbers for sea level rise encourages a predictable public response that 
projected sea level change is moderate, and indeed smaller than in IPCC (2001).  Indeed, there have been 
numerous media reports of “reduced” sea level rise predictions, and commentators have denigrated 
suggestions that business-as-usual greenhouse gas emissions may cause sea level rise measured in meters. 
However, if these IPCC numbers are taken as predictions of actual sea level rise, as they have 
been by the public, they imply that the ice sheets can miraculously survive a BAU climate forcing assault 
for a period of the order of a millennium or longer.  This is not entirely a figment of the IPCC decision to 
provide specific numbers for only a portion of the problem, while demurring from any quantitative 
statement about the most important (dynamical) portion of the problem.  Undoubtedly there are 
glaciologists who anticipate such long response times, because their existing ice sheet models have been 
designed to match paleoclimate changes, which occur on millennial time scales. 
However, Hansen et al (2007) show that the typical ~6ky time scale for paleoclimate ice sheet 
disintegration reflects the half-width of the shortest of the weak orbital forcings that drive the climate 
change, not an inherent time scale of ice sheets for disintegration.  Indeed, the paleoclimate record 
contains numerous examples of ice sheets yielding sea level rise of several meters per century, with 
forcings smaller than that of the BAU scenario.  The problem with the paleoclimate ice sheet models is 
that they do not generally contain the physics of ice streams, effects of surface melt descending through 
crevasses and lubricating basal flow, or realistic interactions with the ocean. 
Rahmstorf (2007) has noted that if one uses observed sea level rise of the past century to calibrate 
a linear projection of future sea level, BAU warming will lead to sea level rise of the order of one meter in 
the present century.  This is a useful observation, as it indicates that sea level change would be substantial 
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even without non-linear collapse of an ice sheet.  However, this approach cannot be taken as a realistic 
way of projecting likely sea level rise under BAU forcing.  The linear approximation fits the past sea level 
change well for the past century only because the two terms contributing significantly to sea level rise 
were (1) thermal expansion of ocean water and (2) melting of alpine glaciers. 
Under BAU forcing in the 21st century, sea level rise undoubtedly will be dominated by a third 
term (3) ice sheet disintegration.  This third term was small until the past few years, but it is has at least 
doubled in the past decade and is now close to 1 mm/year, based on gravity satellite measurements 
discussed above.  As a quantitative example, let us say that the ice sheet contribution is 1 cm for the 
decade 2005-2015 and that it doubles each decade until the West Antarctic ice sheet is largely depleted.  
That time constant yields sea level rise of the order of 5 m this century.  Of course I can not prove that my 
choice of a 10 year doubling time for non-linear response is accurate, but I am confident that it provides a 
far better estimate than a linear response for the ice sheet component of sea level rise. 
An important point is that the non-linear response could easily run out of control, because of 
positive feedbacks and system inertias.  Ocean warming and thus melting of ice shelves will continue 
after growth of the forcing stops, because the ocean response time is long and the temperature at depth is 
far from equilibrium for current forcing.  Ice sheets also have inertia and are far from equilibrium: and as 
ice sheets disintegrate their surface moves lower, where it is warmer, subjecting the ice to additional melt.  
There is also inertia in energy systems: even if it is decided that changes must be made, it may require 
decades to replace infrastructure. 
The nonlinearity of the ice sheet problem makes it impossible to accurately predict sea level 
change on a specific date.  However, as a physicist, I find it almost inconceivable that BAU climate 
change would not yield a sea level change measured in meters on the century time scale.  The threat of 
large sea level change is a principal element in our argument (Hansen et al 2006a,b, 2007) that the global 
community must aim to keep additional global warming less than 1°C above 2000 temperature.  In turn, 
this implies a CO2 limit of about 450 ppm, or less.  Such scenarios are dramatically different than BAU, 




 Is my perspective on this problem really so different than that of other members of the relevant 
scientific community?  Based on interactions with others, I conclude that there is not such a great gap 
between my position and that of most, or at least much, of the relevant community.  The apparent 
difference may be partly a natural reticence to speak out, which I attempt to illuminate via specific 
examples. 
 In the late 1980s Richard Kerr wrote an article titled “Hansen vs. the World on the Greenhouse 
Threat”, reporting on a scientific conference in Amherst, Massachusetts.  One may have surmised strong 
disagreement with my assertion (to Congress) that the world had entered a period of strong warming due 
to human-made greenhouse gases.  But participants told Kerr “if there were a secret ballot at this meeting 
on the question, most people would say the greenhouse warming is probably there.”  And “what bothers 
us is that we have a scientist telling congress things that we are reluctant to say ourselves.”  
 That article made me notice right away a difference between scientists and ‘normal people’.  A 
non-scientist friend from my hometown, who had congratulated me after my congressional testimony, felt 
bad after he saw the article by Kerr.  He obviously believed that I had been shown to be wrong.  However, 
I thought Kerr did a good job of describing the various perspectives, and made it clear, at least between 
the lines, that differences were as much about reticence to speak as about scientific interpretations. 
 IPCC reports may contain a reticence in the sense of being extremely careful about making 
attributions.  This characteristic is appropriately recognized as an asset that makes IPCC conclusions 
authoritative and widely accepted.  It is probably a necessary characteristic, given that the IPCC 
document is produced as a consensus among most nations in the world and represents the views of 
thousands of scientists. 
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 Kerr (2007) describes a specific relevant example, whether IPCC should include estimates of 
dynamical ice sheet loss in their projections: “too poorly understood, IPCC authors said”, and “overly 
cautious – (dynamical effects) could raise sea level much faster than IPCC was predicting” some 
scientists responded.  Kerr goes on to say “almost immediately, new findings have emerged to support 
IPCC’s conservative position.”  Glaciologist Richard Alley, an IPCC lead author, said “Lots of people 
were saying we [IPCC authors] should extrapolate into the future, but we dug our heels in at the IPCC 
and said that we don’t know enough to give an answer.” 
 
6. Our Legacy 
 Reticence is fine for IPCC.  And individual scientists can choose to stay within a comfort zone, 
not needing to worry that they say something that proves to be slightly wrong.  But perhaps we should 
also consider our legacy from a broader perspective.  Do we not know enough to say more? 
 Confidence in a scientific inference can be built from many factors.  For climate change these 
include knowledge gained from studying paleoclimate changes, analysis of how the Earth has responded 
to forcings on various time scales, climate simulations and tests of these against observations, detailed 
study of climate change in recent decades and how the nature of observed change compares with 
expectations, measurements of changes in atmospheric composition and calculation of implied climate 
forcings, analysis of ways in which climate response varies among different forcings, quantitative data on 
different feedback processes and how these compare with expectations, and so on. 
 Can the broader perspective drawn from various sources of information allow us to ‘see the forest 
for the trees’, to ‘separate the wheat from the chaff’?  That a glacier on Greenland slowed after speeding 
up, used as ‘proof’ that reticence is appropriate, is little different than the common misconception that a 
cold weather snap disproves global warming.  Spatial and temporal fluctuations are normal, short-term 
expectations for Greenland glaciers are different from long-term expectations for West Antarctica.  
Integration via the gravity satellite measurements puts individual glacier fluctuations in proper 
perspective.  The broader picture gives strong indication that ice sheets will, and are already beginning to, 
respond in a nonlinear fashion to global warming.  There is enough information now, in my opinion, to 
make it a near certainty that IPCC BAU climate forcing scenarios would lead to disastrous multi-meter 
sea level rise on the century time scale. 
 There is, in my opinion, a huge gap between what is understood about human-made global 
warming and its consequences, and what is known by the people who most need to know, the public and 
policy makers.  IPCC is doing a commendable job, but we need something more.  Given the reticence that 
IPCC necessarily exhibits, there need to be supplementary mechanisms.  The onus, it seems to me, falls 
on us scientists as a community.   
Important decisions are being made now and in the near future.  An example is the large number 
of new efforts to make liquid fuels from coal, and a resurgence of plans for energy intensive “cooking” of 
tar-shale mountains to squeeze out liquid hydrocarbon fuels.  These are just the sort of actions needed to 
preserve a BAU greenhouse gas path indefinitely.  We know enough about the carbon cycle to say that at 
least of the order of a quarter of the CO2 emitted in burning fossil fuels under a BAU scenario will stay in 
the air “forever”, the latter defined practically as more than 500 years.  Readily available conventional oil 
and gas are enough to take atmospheric CO2 to a level of the order of 450 ppm. 
In this circumstance it seems vital that we provide the best information we can about the threat to 
the great ice sheets posed by human-made climate change.  This information, and necessary caveats, 
should be provided publicly, and in plain language.  The best suggestion I can think of is for the National 
Academy of Sciences to carry out a study, in the tradition of the Charney and Cicerone reports on global 
warming.  I would be glad to hear alternative suggestions. 
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